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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—PROBATIONARY SEARCHES: 
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS CELL 
PHONE SEARCHES OF PROBATIONERS 
State v. Gonzalez, 2015 ND 106, 862 N.W.2d 535 
ABSTRACT 
 
In State v. Gonzalez, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that 
probationers are subject to warrantless searches of their cell phones 
pursuant to their probationary conditions and a finding of reasonable 
suspicion.  The court concluded that since Gonzalez’s probationary terms 
allowed for a search of his residence and vehicle, the search would 
reasonably allow for the searching of items—which could contain 
evidence—within these locations.  Since the cell phones found were items 
within the confines of his residence and vehicle, the search of the cell 
phones was upheld as a reasonable probationary search.  This case 
demonstrates the broad search powers the State is afforded when a search is 
deemed a probationary search.  This decision has significant implications 
because cell phone searches of probationers may be a stepping stone to 
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I. FACTS 
In January of 2004, Garron Gonzalez pled guilty to two counts of gross 
sexual imposition.1  In addition to incarceration, Gonzalez was sentenced to 
five years of probation.2  His probationary terms, in part, required that “he 
submit to a search of his vehicle or place of residence by any probation 
officer at any time of the day or night.”3  Additional terms included not 
having unsupervised contact with females under eighteen or possessing 
sexually stimulating materials.4 
In December of 2010, the Mandan Police Department notified 
Gonzalez’s probation officer that Gonzalez was being investigated for 
having contact with a minor.5  Pursuant to this information, the probation 
officer and law enforcement searched Gonzalez’s residence and vehicle.6  
Ultimately, the officers seized two smartphone cell phones found in his 
 
1. State v. Gonzalez, 2015 ND 106, ¶ 2, 862 N.W.2d 535, 538. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. ¶ 3. 
4. Id.  
5. Id. ¶ 4. 
6. Id.  
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residence and vehicle—one in each—believing that they contained evidence 
of contact with a minor.7  After seizing the phones, the probation officer 
accessed the phones and looked through them.8  Subsequently, the officer 
found evidence of Gonzalez violating his probationary terms and arrested 
Gonzalez.9  Notably, the probation officer also searched the phones at a 
later date to compile further evidence against Gonzalez.10 
The State alleged Gonzalez had violated two conditions of his 
probation: no contact with a minor under the age of eighteen and no 
possessing sexually stimulating material.11  The district court agreed 
Gonzalez violated his conditions and revoked Gonzalez’s probation.12  As a 
result, the court resentenced him to twenty years, to run consecutively, on 
his two gross sexual imposition charges.13 
In August of 2012, Gonzalez filed an application for post-conviction 
release, and the district court ordered a new hearing for the petition of 
revocation.14  Prior to this hearing, Gonzalez filed a motion to suppress 
evidence.15  The evidence he wished to suppress was the information 
obtained from the cell phone searches.16  His basis for the suppression was 
that the State violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a search 
without a warrant or one reasonable pursuant to his probationary terms.17  
The court denied the motion because “Gonzalez had notice that any of his 
personal effects were subject to the search condition and the warrantless 
search of the cell phones was reasonable.”18  On appeal, Gonzalez argued 
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence based 
upon what his probationary terms stated, the unreasonableness of the 
search, and by violating his Fourth Amendment rights.19 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution protects citizens from 
 
7. Id.  
8. Id. 
9. Id.  
10. Id. ¶ 29, 862 N.W.2d at 543. 
11. Id. ¶ 5, 862 N.W.2d at 538. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. ¶ 6. 
15. Id. ¶ 7. 
16. Id. 
17. See id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. ¶ 10, 862 N.W.2d at 539. 
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unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.20  The general rule 
regarding searches and seizures is that law enforcement must obtain a 
search warrant to either conduct a search or seize evidence.21  However, a 
warrant may not be necessary if the search in question falls within one of 
the recognized exceptions to the search warrant rule.22 
A. CONDITIONS OF PROBATIONERS 
One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is 
searches of probationers.23  Therefore, probationers can be the subject of a 
search without the need to first receive a search warrant.24  The rationale for 
this exception is that probationers are afforded less privacy than an 
ordinary, law-abiding citizen.25  Probationers have demonstrated their 
willingness to commit a crime and harm society; therefore, the government 
has a legitimate interest in preventing further harm from a known 
perpetrator.26  As a result, probationers are commonly subjected to abridged 
freedoms, such as a reduction in privacy in the form of relaxed warrant 
requirements on searches.27 
In North Dakota, courts can “[s]ubmit the defendant’s person, place of 
residence, or vehicle to search and seizure by a probation officer at any time 
of the day or night, with or without a search warrant” by stating so in the 
probationer’s terms.28  Furthermore, once a search is underway, the courts 
have allowed items found within the enumerated search area to be searched 
as well, even though the terms of probation did not explicitly list the item.29  
In United States v. Yuknavich,30 a federal appellate court allowed a 
computer within a probationer’s residence to be searched.31  While the 
computer was not explicitly listed under the term of probation, the court 
allowed the additional search of the computer because the terms of 
probation stated that the probationer’s internet usage would be monitored.32  
Therefore, the item searched must be related to the underlying crime or the 
 
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
21. See State v. Hurt, 2007 ND 192, ¶ 6, 743 N.W.2d 102, 104. 
22. Id. 
23. See State v. Adams, 2010 ND 184, ¶ 12, 788 N.W.2d 619, 623. 
24. See id. ¶¶ 11-12. 
25. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-20 (2001).  
26. See id. at 120-21. 
27. See id. at 121-22. 
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-07, -07(4)(n) (2015). 
29. State v. Gonzalez, 2015 ND 106, ¶ 17, 862 N.W.2d, 535, 540. 
30. 419 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 31. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d at 1311. 
32. See id. at 1310-11. 
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probationary terms, as the probationer should have notice of the possible 
searches they may be subjected to during probation.33 
B. REASONABLENESS 
Additionally, the search must have been reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness standard.34  Under the reasonableness 
standard, courts “assess[], on the one hand, the degree to which [the search 
or seizure] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”35  Therefore, the United States Supreme Court has held that a 
warrantless search of a probationer, supported by reasonable suspicion and 
pursuant to a probationer’s conditions, satisfies the reasonableness standard 
of the Fourth Amendment.36 
III. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS 
Justice Sandstrom delivered the opinion of the court in Gonzalez.37  
Notably, the court analyzed four issues.  First, whether the terms of 
Gonzalez’s probation gave law enforcement the right to search his cell 
phones.38  Second, whether cell phones of probationers are afforded more 
protection than other personal property.39  Third, whether the probation 
officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search.40  Fourth, whether 
the subsequent searches of the cell phones days later were lawful.41  The 
court affirmed the district court on all issues and ruled in favor of the 
State.42 
A. EQUATING CELL PHONES TO CONTAINERS 
Gonzalez’s cell phones were valid search items because they were 
found within Gonzalez’s residence and vehicle, which could be searched 
according to Gonzalez’s probationary terms.43  While the cell phones were 
 
33. Gonzalez, ¶ 18, 862 N.W.2d at 540-41. 
34. See id. ¶ 25, 862 N.W.2d at 542. 
35. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999). 
36. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).  
37. Justice Sandstrom was joined by the entirety of the court: Justices Crothers, McEvers, 
Kapsner (concurring in the result only), and Chief Justice VandeWalle. Gonzalez, ¶ 32, 862 
N.W.2d at 543. 
38. Id. ¶ 14, 862 N.W.2d at 539-40. 
39. Id. ¶ 20, 862 N.W.2d at 541. 
40. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 862 N.W.2d at 542. 
41. Id. ¶ 28, 862 N.W.2d at 543. 
42. Id. ¶ 31. 
43. Id. ¶ 16, 862 N.W.2d at 540. 
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not explicitly listed under his terms, common sense and precedent dictate 
that containers found within the listed areas must also be allowed to be 
searched as well.44  If the court ignored this rationale, “[A] probation officer 
could search [the probationer’s] house or vehicle and seize any evidence 
found in plain sight but would not be authorized to search anything located 
in the house or vehicle where evidence of a probation violation may be 
contained . . . .”45 
In Adams, a safe found within a residence—although not expressly 
stated in the probationer’s conditions46—was allowed to be searched 
without a warrant, pursuant to the probationer’s terms.47  The Adams court, 
much like the Gonzalez court, stated that “[t]o conclude the search [of the 
safe] was unreasonable would give probationers the ability to effectively 
render warrantless probation searches meaningless, because probationers 
could avoid warrantless searches merely by securing items in a locked 
box.”48  Notably, the court’s treatment of containers found in probationary 
searches is quite similar to containers found in cars, pursuant to a search 
incident to an arrest or under the automobile exception.49  Ultimately, the 
Gonzalez court ruled that searching items that are related to the underlying 
offense and within an enumerated area under the terms of probation, such as 
cell phones, puts the probationer on notice and is a reasonable search under 
the Fourth Amendment.50 
B. DISTINGUISHING RILEY V. CALIFORNIA 
The court also disagreed with Gonzalez that probationer’s cell phones 
are held to a higher standard of protection than most personal property.51  
Essentially, Gonzalez argues cell phones contain details about many aspects 
of people’s lives, from personal to professional, and to hold them out as an 
 
44. See id. ¶ 17. 
45. Id. (emphasis added). 
46. The probationer’s terms in Adams included a search of her person, residence, vehicle, or 
any accessible property.  State v. Adams, 2010 ND 184, ¶ 2, 788 N.W.2d 619, 621.  
47. Id. ¶ 17, 788 N.W.2d at 625.  
48. Id.  
49. The search incident to arrest exception allows law enforcement to conduct a warrantless 
search of an arrestee and their immediate area for weapons or evidence, contemporaneous with the 
arrest.  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).  Illinois v. Lafayette expanded this 
search to containers.  462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983).  The automobile exception (or Carroll Doctrine) 
allows law enforcement to execute a warrantless search of a vehicle if the officer has probable 
cause that evidence of a crime is present within the vehicle.  See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 149 (1925).  California v. Acevedo allowed searches of containers in vehicles as long as 
probable cause existed for the container as well.  500 U.S. 565, 576 (1991). 
50. Gonzalez, ¶ 18, 862 N.W.2d at 540-41.  
51. See id. ¶¶ 20-22, 862 N.W.2d at 541. 
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ordinary piece of property is absurd.52  Therefore, Gonzalez contends that 
cell phones require a warrant to be searched, even in the case of 
probationers.53  To provide support for this proposition, Gonzalez relies on 
Riley v. California.54  In Riley, the U.S. Supreme Court found that a cell 
phone search pursuant to a search incident to an arrest was unreasonable 
without a search warrant.55  The Riley Court reasoned, similarly as 
Gonzalez did, that cell phones hold “the privacies of life” for numerous 
people.56 
However, as the Gonzalez court contends, the search incident exception 
and the probation exception are quite different.57  One of the primary 
reasons for the search incident exception is to protect an officer’s safety.58  
Searches incident to an arrest were largely performed to ensure the arrestee 
did not have a weapon that could be used to injure an arresting officer.59  
Therefore, searching an arrestee’s cell phone is unlikely to address this 
concern.60 
Furthermore, probationary searches are performed only after an 
individual is convicted of a crime; a search incident to an arrest, on the 
other hand, is performed upon somebody who has only been arrested and is 
a suspect of a crime.61  Probation is a sentence for committing a crime, and 
the government has a legitimate interest in preventing further crime from 
being committed.62  Not only does a probationer often consent to the terms 
of probation in lieu of potential incarceration, but the State has the right to 
use reasonable means to prevent further crimes from being committed.63  
Therefore, especially when a search of a cell phone can produce significant 
evidence of wrong-doing related to the underlying offense, the State’s 
warrantless search of these items is permitted.64  The Riley Court 
recognized the unique differences of the search incident exception by 
stating, “[O]ther case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless 
 
52. See Brief of Appellant at 19-20, State v. Gonzalez, 2015 ND 106, 862 N.W.2d 535 (No. 
20140213).  
53. See Gonzalez, ¶ 20, 862 N.W.2d at 541. 
54. Id. 
55. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). 
56. Id. at 2494-95 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
57. Gonzalez, ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 541. 
58. Id. ¶ 21. 
59. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). 
60. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484-85. 
61. See Gonzalez, ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 541-42. 
62. Id. at 542. 
63. See id.  
64. See id. 
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search of a particular phone.”65  Due to the stark differences, the Gonzalez 
court elected to distinguish Riley and ruled the cell phones fell within the 
probation exception to the search warrant requirement.66 
C. REASONABLENESS 
The court also established reasonable suspicion, under the 
reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment, was present.67  The court 
determined this by employing the totality of the circumstances test.68  
Under this test, the court looked at whether the probation officer had 
reasonable suspicion that Gonzalez was “engaging in unlawful activity.”69  
If the requisite reasonable suspicion was present, the search of the cell 
phones was reasonable.70 
The court’s analysis largely fell on Gonzalez’s specific probationary 
conditions and the pending investigation by the Mandan Police 
Department.71  Since Gonzalez’s conditions stated he could not have 
contact with minor, the investigation of him having contact with a minor 
gave the probation officer enough suspicion to search Gonzalez’s residence, 
vehicle, and any contents within these areas that may provide evidence that 
Gonzalez violated his terms.72 
D. SUBSEQUENT SEARCHES 
Additionally, the court ruled the subsequent searches of the cell phones 
in the days after the initial search did not violate Gonzalez’s rights under 
the Fourth Amendment.73  After evidence was found on the phones of 
Gonzalez violating his probationary conditions, he lacked a privacy interest 
in them according to the court.74  Furthermore, additional searches of them, 
after the fact, would not impede upon his rights.75  For support, the court 
invoked the words used in United States v. Burnette, stating that “[o]nce an 
item in an individual’s possession has been lawfully seized and searched, 
subsequent searches of that item, so long as it remains in the legitimate 
 
65. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
66. Gonzalez, ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 542. 
67. Id. ¶ 27, 862 N.W.2d at 543. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. See id. ¶ 26, 862 N.W.2d at 542. 
71. See id. ¶ 27, 862 N.W.2d at 543. 
72. See id. at 542-43. 
73. Id. ¶ 30, 862 N.W.2d at 543. 
74. Id. ¶ 29. 
75. Id. 
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uninterrupted possession of the police, may be conducted without a 
warrant.”76 
IV. IMPACT OF DECISION 
The Gonzalez decision is likely one of many cases in the near future in 
which the North Dakota Supreme Court will have to address a “cell phone” 
search.  Cell phones are no longer a simple means of communication; they 
are an intimate part of a person’s life.  This cuts both ways for law 
enforcement.  On the one hand, law enforcement has a way of gaining very 
detailed information about an individual and any potential criminal 
behavior; on the other hand, individuals may have a heightened expectation 
of privacy with cell phones—such was the case in Riley.77  In which case, 
law enforcement is not permitted from uncovering this information without 
a warrant. 
A. HOW CELL PHONES ARE TO BE VIEWED 
One of the most interesting arguments made by the court in Gonzalez is 
that cell phones are generally nothing more than containers.78  The court 
essentially equates Gonzalez’s smartphone cell phones to the safe found in 
Adams.79  Notably, a safe may contain important paperwork pertaining to an 
individual, such as a passport, or conceal evidence of a crime, such as a bag 
of marijuana.  However, a safe generally does not have a contact list, 
personal messages, photos, a browsing history, a GPS feature to track 
previous locations, and “apps” that could give away intimate details about a 
person’s life.80  For example, a weight-loss app likely displays a person’s 
weight; a banking app may display a person’s finances; and a school-related 
app can access a person’s grades. 
The Riley Court recognized the inherent problems with equating a cell 
phone to other personal property and determined one’s privacy interest in 
cell phones is heightened.81  The North Dakota Supreme Court addresses 
this issue in Gonzalez by claiming probationers, in general, have a 
diminished expectation of privacy.82  Therefore, a probationer’s terms—
putting him or her on notice—and a probation officer’s reasonable 
suspicion are enough to overcome what little expectations a probationer 
 
76. Id. (quoting United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1049 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
77. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494-95 (2014). 
78. See Gonzalez, ¶ 17, 862 N.W.2d at 540. 
79. See id.  
80. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490. 
81. See id. at 2494-95.  
82. See Gonzalez, ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 542. 
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may have pertaining to a warrantless search of a cell phone.83  Should this 
rationale be expanded to other warrantless searches? 
B. INFLUENCE ON OTHER “SPECIAL NEEDS” SEARCHES IN NORTH 
DAKOTA 
The probation exception is but one exception to the warrant 
requirement.  Other such exceptions include search incident to arrest, the 
automobile exception, inventory searches of vehicles, public employee 
searches, school searches of students, or border searches, just to name a 
few.84  Additionally, “the Supreme Court has held that certain 
programmatic searches do not require a warrant or probable cause when 
they are conducted in furtherance of a government ‘special need’ other than 
investigation of criminal activity.”85  However, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court has issued very few decisions on cell phone searches and none within 
the contexts of these search exceptions, other than the Gonzalez decision.  
Therefore, Gonzalez gave us an indication as to how North Dakota is going 
to approach these types of cases.  Applying this “watered-down” 
expectation of privacy approach to these “special needs” cases should allow 
for more warrantless searches of cell phones, as long as the public official 
has reasonable suspicion to believe a policy violation or crime has been 
committed. 
For example, it has been long recognized that students attending public 
schools are not afforded their full constitutional rights due to the safety 
concerns inherent in such a setting.86  It would seem, based on the Gonzalez 
decision, that a warrantless search of a student’s cell phone—which many 
grade-schoolers likely carry these days—would be valid, as long as the 
teacher or other staff member had reasonable suspicion that the student was 
violating a policy of the school or breaking a law.  Therefore, something as 
simple as texting in class—likely a violation of classroom policy—could 
allow the teacher the ability to search through the student’s phone.  This 
hopefully would end once the teacher’s suspicions are confirmed or denied.  
Likewise, public employees, such as a public university professor, could 
also be subject to warrantless searches of their cell phones.  While the 
court’s decision in Gonzalez only applied to probationers, the court’s 
analysis will likely pave the way for an expansion to these other “special 
 
83. See id. ¶ 25, 862 N.W.2d at 542. 
84. Warrantless Searches and Seizures, INVESTIGATIONS AND POLICE PRACTICES, 44 GEO. 
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 48, 48 (2015). 
85. Id. at 165. 
86. Pat Garza, Privacy Policy: Riley v. California and Cellphone Searches in Schools, 78 
TEX. B.J. 128, 129 (2015). 
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needs” cases.  In particular, students of public schools and public 
employees could soon find themselves having their cell phones searched 
without the need for a warrant. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Gonzalez, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a warrantless 
search of a probationer’s cell phones was reasonable, as long as supported 
by reasonable suspicion and the terms of probation.87  The court 
distinguished this case from the Riley decision by stating that “the 
warrantless search of a cell phone under a probation search condition is 
different from a search incident to arrest.”88  Notably, probationers enjoy a 
diminished expectation of privacy compared to ordinary citizens.  Since this 
is a common theme in “special needs” cases, the court will have to decide 
whether warrantless cell phone searches are limited to probationers or 





87. Gonzalez, ¶ 30, 862 N.W.2d at 543. 
88. Id. ¶ 23, 862 N.W.2d at 542. 
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